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ESSAYS: IS THE CONSTITUTION WORKING?
The following four essays were presented in a panel discussion as part
of the University of Dayton's series of programs commemorating the
bicentennial of the Constitution, Dayton, Ohio, October 15, 1986.

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE
CONSTITUTION
Roberta Sue Alexander*
Those who study and interpret the United States Constitution inevitably engage, at some point and to some extent, in historical analysis. A study of the past, we are often reminded, can provide useful lessons for the present. Recently, an historical approach has become even
more important as many contend that the basis upon which the Constitution should be interpreted by the courts is the intent of that document's framers.' But trying to discern the lessons of history can be a
tricky business. If one reads the debates at the Constitutional Convention, it becomes quite clear that those involved in formulating our Constitution held conflicting views based on different assumptions.' More* Professor of History, University of Dayton. B.A., University of California (1964); M.A. &
Ph.D., University of Chicago (1966 & 1974).
1. See, e.g., Meese, The Battle for the Constitution: The Attorney General Replies to His
Critics, 35 POL'Y REV. 32 (1986); Meese, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a
Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455 (1986).
2. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1966).
Innumerable works have been written on the Constitutional Convention and the delegates
who played a leading role in its work. See generally C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); L. BENSON, TURNER AND BEARD: AMERICAN HISTORICAL WRITING RECONSIDERED (1960); C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE
STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787 (1966); R. BROWN.
CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF "AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION" (1956); R. BROWN, A REINTERPRETATION OF THE FORMATION OF
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1963); P. EIDELBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1968); M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781 (1940); M. JENSEN, THE NEW NATION (1950); F. McDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FORMATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1790 (1965); F. McDONALD. WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1958); R. MORRIS, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION RECONSIDERED
(1967); C. ROSSITER. 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966); D. SMITH, THE CONVENTION AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1965); C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1937); G. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); THE CONFEDERATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION: THE CRITICAL ISSUES (G. Wood ed. 1973); Adair, The Tenth Federalist Revisited, 8 WM. & MARY Q. 48 (1951); Elkins & McKitrick, The Founding Fathers: Young Men of
the Revolution, 76 POL. SCI. Q. 181 (1961); Hutson, Creation of the Constitution: Scholarship at
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over, these delegates, even after they voted for various constitutional
provisions, interpreted them differently.' If the delegates themselves
could not agree on what they meant, how can we ever hope to know
what their intent was? Yet, if we are to explore whether the Constitution is working, we should at least try to ascertain, at least in a very
general way, what the Founding Fathers4 attempted to achieve during
that hot summer in Philadelphia in 1787. Such an analysis should provide us with some of the background material which is necessary to
begin an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of our current framework of government.
There are many aspects of the Constitution one can study. Most
constitutional scholars today, it seems, tend to focus on key sections of
the Bill of Rights, for that is what currently preoccupies the courts.
But, of course, the Bill of Rights was not part of the work of the Constitutional Convention. While acknowledging that one of the primary
objectives of government was the preservation of liberty, the Founding
Fathers believed that a properly formulated government would be the
best protection of minority rights. They, therefore, concentrated on the
overall structure of government, and their concern for a proper balance
of powers remained the nation's and the courts' chief focus until after

a Standstill, 12 REV. AM. HIST. 463 (1984) (reviews the historiography of the creation of the
Constitution from its ratification to the present); Roche, The Founding Fathers:A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 799 (1961); Wolfe, On Understanding the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, 39 J. POL. 97 (1977).
3. See, e.g.. J. MADISON, supra note 2, at 320-22 (debate over the provision to guarantee
each state a republican form of government). Gouverneur Morris and William Houston thought
the provision would guarantee existing laws and state constitutions, thereby preventing states from
altering these documents. Others thought it gave the central government the right to suppress
rebellions which might occur in the states. If this latter interpretation was what was intended,
John Rutledge argued that it was unnecessary, because he felt Congress already had the authority; others disagreed. This issue was never resolved; the intent of the provision remained unclear.
The debate ended, and the delegates adopted the provision.
Another example concerns the subject of taxation. Delegate Rufus King "asked what was the
precise meaning of direct taxation? [But n]o one answered." Id. at 494.
On yet another occasion, James McHenry proposed that "no State shall be restrained from
laying duties of tonnage for the purpose of clearing harbours and erecting light-houses." Id. at
644. Gouverneur Morris replied that under the proposed Constitution, the states could already do
so. Id. Therefore, such a provision was unnecessary. James Madison disagreed: "Whether the
States are now restrained from laying tonnage duties depends on the extent of the power 'to
regulate commerce.' These terms are vague, but seem to exclude this power of the States. . . . He
was more & more convinced that the regulation of Commerce was in its nature indivisible and
ought to be wholly under one authority." Id. at 644-45. Roger Sherman disagreed; he believed
that concurrent jurisdiction was allowable. Id. at 645. This debate was not resolved in the Convention. Delegates voted Congress the power to regulate commerce, but there remained in their minds
different interpretations of what the power encompassed. The delegates left the definition of commerce to the courts to decide. The courts were not to decide what the delegates intended, for they
knew that was impossible, but what the courts felt was appropriate to the situation under review.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/5
4. This term is used to mean those men who signed and supported the Constitution.
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the Civil War. This issue has just recently reemerged as an area of
interest as a result of both the Watergate scandal and the recent activities of some members of the executive branch of government in Iran
and Central America. This paper, therefore, will examine the structure
of government that the Founding Fathers created, using the debates at
the Constitutional Convention as its major source. It will attempt to
show how the Framers intended to provide the country with a government which could be both effective and yet limited so individual liberties would be preserved.
The Founding Fathers came to Philadelphia determined to remedy
the vices that they saw permeating their government and their country.
In attempting to find solutions, they turned to history as well as to the
philosophies and theories of political science of their day. Their debates
are filled with their analyses of past republics and past confederacies as
well as their views on the strengths and weaknesses of the British Constitution. They hoped to learn from the mistakes of others.
The Founding Fathers quite wisely realized, however, that they
could not merely duplicate what others had done; they were a different
people, in a different age, with different needs and different problems.
While they sought to learn from the past, they set about to create a
government entirely unlike any other the world had known. This government was to be based on new theories and principles which they
believed fit the temper of the American people and the conditions of
their new nation.
On July 4, 1776, when Americans declared their independence
from Great Britian, optimism pervaded the nation. England, they believed, had become a corrupt society with a corrupt government, threatening American liberties. Great Britain was succumbing to the fate of
all previous empires-she was growing too fat with wealth and power
and would decline just as Rome had declined. Americans were different. Their revolution would inaugurate a new era of republican government, dedicated to promoting liberty and the overall happiness of the
people. The creation of a republic, however, would entail more than
simply eliminating a king and substituting an elective system of government. Their vision was an utopian one. They would, through their government, reorder society and politics to ensure liberty and equality.
Their definitions of liberty and equality were, however, different from
those we have today. To these revolutionaries, liberty would be
achieved through a government dedicated to the "public good." To
them, the public good was the promotion of stability and the protection
of private property. These goals, they believed, would promote the people's happiness. While America would also be based on the principle of
equality,
equality 1986
did not mean a social leveling. What the Founding
Published
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Fathers sought was a government elected by the people, who chose as
their leaders the natural aristocracy-that is, those who were most
qualified based on talent, virtue, and devotion to the public good.'
This millennial vision was crumbling by the 1780's. Many Americans had become disillusioned; their young state was faltering. John
Randolph, a delegate from Virginia, in the first major speech delivered
at the Constitutional Convention, summarized what most other delegates believed. They had to create a new government if they were to
'
prevent "the fulfilment of the prophecies of the American downfal."
Signs of anarchy and selfishness were everywhere. States failed to pay
Congress' requisitions, the central government had no money, and the
foreign debt went unpaid. States that paid their requisitions were bitter
toward those that did not. Moreover, commercial discord had arisen
among the states as some enacted trade barriers against others. Delegates to the central Congress did not show up; it was nearly impossible
to obtain a quorum. Nine states had their own navies. Treaties were
violated. In other words, as Randolph contended, the "government
could not defend itself against the incroachments from the states ...
The prospect of anarchy . . . [was] every where." 7 Every effort to solve
these problems through constitutional amendments was thwarted as individual states jealously guarded their power. Many feared that the na8
tion was disintegrating and would be taken over by foreign powers.
Other signs of anarchy abounded. People were not even obeying
the laws which were enacted by their state governments, for they in9
creasingly believed that those legislatures were not speaking for them.
And in the spirit of the philosophy of the American Revolution-if
government does not serve the people's interest, the people have a right
to overthrow it-alienated groups began opposing their legislatures and
taking the law into their own hands. Riots and mob action occurred
with increasing frequency. The most threatening was Shay's Rebellion
of 1786, in which disgruntled Massachusetts farmers, trying to save
their property from being confiscated for nonpayment of debts,
marched on their courthouses and closed them down. The Founding
Fathers feared that rebellion would become contagious and that property would be destroyed. But if it were any consolation, traditional po-

For a detailed discussion of the nation's ideology during the revolutionary era, see G.
supra note 2, at 46-74. Also helpful is B. BAILYN. IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967). See also sources cited supra note 2.
6. J. MADISON, supra note 2, at 28.
7. Id. at 30.
8. See id. at 28-30; see also G. WOOD, supra note 2. For a different vision of the Confederation period, see the works of M. JENSEN, supra note 2.
9. See G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 363-71.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/5
5.
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litical theory predicted that such anarchy might occur; throughout history, this had always been the fate of republican governments.1 0
A far more frightening phenomenon was troubling the young nation. More disturbing than anarchy and the breakdown of governmental authority was the threat of tyranny, a new kind tyranny-a tyranny
by the people themselves. John Randolph explained that a new constitution was needed "to provide a cure for the evils under which the U.S.
laboured; that in tracing these evils to their origin every man had found
it in the turbulence and follies of democracy." 1 Elbridge Gerry, a delegate from Massachusetts, agreed: "The evils we experience flow from
the excesses of democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are the
dupes of pretended patriots."1 2 They "are daily misled into the most
baneful measures and opinions by the false reports circulated by designing men." ' s Therefore, the Constitutional Convention had to create
a system which would guard against "the danger of the levilling
' The people
spirit."14
were electing selfish, incompetent, unworthy men
to their state legislatures, "[m]en of indigence, ignorance & baseness.""' What brought James Madison, the "Father of the Constitution," to the Convention as a devout nationalist was his experience
serving in the Virginia Legislature for four years. There he saw instability and confusion, poorly written laws, and the decline in the quality
of its members. Instead of virtuous men, there were representatives
who were influenced by interest groups such as land speculators or who
were merely scrambling for their own private advantage. 6
Most of those who attended the Philadelphia Convention agreed
that the state legislatures, in the hands of these incompetents, were
running amuck-enacting paper money laws, force acts, and statutes
which suspended the recovery of debts. The rights of the minority-the
propertied classes-were being trampled. 17 The fact that such legislation did represent the will of the majority disturbed the Founding Fathers the most. For Madison, the chief fear was that "the few will be
unnecessarily sacrificed to the many."' 8 The main cause of these dis-

10.

See, e.g., J.

MADISON,

supra note 2, at 402, 404, 656-59; G. WOOD, supra note 2, at

403.
II. J. MADISON, supra note 2, at 42.
12. Id. at 39.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 73.
16. Hobson, The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis
of Republican Government, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 215, 224 (1979).
17. See J. MADISON, supra note 2, at 13-19, 29-30, 73-74, 402, 404, 656-59.
18. G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 413 (citing Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 17,
1788). by eCommons, 1986
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turbing events was that designing, incapable, untalented men were
dominating governments rather than the natural aristocracy who the
Founding Fathers believed were the only people who had the necessary
education, refinements, and training to legislate wisely for the public
good. 19
Thus, the men who eventually gathered in Philadelphia acted to
correct two contradictory tendencies: that the national government
would be ineffective or that it would be tyrannical. The nationalists
(later called Federalists) proposed an entirely new system of government to solve the weaknesses inherent in the confederation and to prevent the excesses occurring in the states. The difficulty that they faced
was how to create a democracy which could still be strong enough to
protect itself from foreign powers, as well as to secure private property
rights against the debtor majority. To solve this problem, the Founders
proposed a government based on the new concept of federalism, combined with the new notion of popular sovereignty, and limited by the
institutional device of checks and balances.
The delegates agreed that all branches of their new government
had to be selected, either directly or indirectly, by the people if the
people were to have confidence in and support that government. But
how in a democratic republic could one be certain that the people
would elect qualified representatives? James Madison proposed the solution: The problem, as he saw it, was that the districts from which
representatives were chosen were too small. Consequently, a government had to be created which would "enlarge the sphere as far as the
nature of the Govt. would admit. This was the only defence agst. the
inconveniencies of democracy consistent with the democratic form of
Govt."2 0 The old notion that republics had to be small and have a homogeneous population to survive was wrong. It was clear that the people were not homogeneous. Society would always be divided among
"rich & poor, debtors & creditors, the landed, the manufacturing,
[and] the commercial interests."2 1 In addition, as Madison continued,
In framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we shd not lose sight
of the changes which ages will produce. An increase of population will of
necessity increase the proportion of those who will labour under all the
hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its
blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the
feeling of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power
will slide into the hands of the former. . . . [S]ymtoms, of a leveling

19. See J. MADISON, supra note 2, at 73-74; G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 476-99.
20. J. MADISON, supra note 2, at 76.
21. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/5
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spirit, have sufficiently appeared in . . . certain quarters to give notice of
the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded agst. on republican
22
principles?
Madison's solution was to enlarge the republican state to stifle the propensity of small republics to act rashly. In a large society, people would
be broken up into so many interests and factions that a common sentiment would less likely be felt and an oppressive majority hard to
form.23 Moreover, the natural elite would be chosen to run this new
government. Designing politicians could win only in small districts
where their demagoguery could be effective. Enlarging the district
would temper crass electioneering. Reputation and talent would count
more. As James Wilson, a Pennsylvania delegate, argued, the election
of representatives from large districts would be the "most likely [way]
to obtain men of intelligence & uprightness. 12 4 "There is no danger of
improper elections if made by large districts. Bad elections proceed
from the smallness of the districts which give an opportunity to bad
'2 5
men to intrigue themselves into office."
The government that the Federalists originally proposed in the
Virginia Plan, however, was not quite what they received. They envisioned a strong national government with state power greatly diminished. They were forced to compromise with those who feared small
state interests would be swallowed up. But the desires of the small state
delegates created a theoretical problem. The common political notion
at the time was that sovereignty was indivisible; there could be but one
absolute, supreme power.2 6 In Britain, the supreme power was Parliament. In the United States, under the Articles of Confederation, it was
the states. How could the states protect themselves from the encroachment of this new national government if they did not retain their sovereignty? If the states were sovereign, how could a national government
be effective? James Wilson provided the solution when he argued that
no government is sovereign; it is the people who are sovereign. They
retain the power and merely dispense portions of it for the public
good-some to the national government and some to the states.2 7 From
this federalist solution, a clear idea of constitutionalism developed. A
22.
23.

Id. at 194.

See id. at 76-77 (Madison's speeches); id. at 75, 85, 157-58 (Wilson's speeches); THE
No. 10 (J. Madison) (Madison also elaborates on the idea of a large republican
state). For further elaboration on these ideas, see G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 499-518.
24. J. MADISON, note 2, at 85.
25. Id. at 74.
26. For a fuller discussion of the eighteenth century notion of sovereignty and the shift in
American thought on this topic, see G. WOOD, supra note 2, at 344-92.
27. 1 PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787-1788, at 229, 301-02,
316-17,by389
(J. McMaster
& F. Stone eds. 1970).
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constitution distributes and limits power. It is the supreme law which
no government or branch of government can change or disobey. Only
the people can amend the constitution. From this evolves the very undemocratic notion (if democracy is defined as majority rule) of judicial
review, where a nonelected judiciary determines whether any branch of
government has exceeded its authority under the constitution.
Thus, a federalist system developed, a system of a limited government with power divided between the central government and the
states.2 8 The final solution to the question of majority tyranny was a
system of checks and balances.2 9 All power still stemmed from the people, but the people sometimes acted capriciously and reasoned incorrectly.3 0 The Senate and the President, in Madison's view, were to protect the people from themselves. 1 The Senate and the President, still
elected at least indirectly by the people, would check the "sudden impulses" of the majority "to commit injustice on the minority. 32
The system which emerged was designed to solve the problems of
late eighteenth-century America. How well has it survived for two hundred years as society changed and new problems developed? In examining this question again, we focus on the structure of government. The
government created in 1787 was not an efficient government. The system of checks and balances was designed to prevent hasty action. But
for a world power, quick action is often needed. Moreover, the original
system of federalism has been radically altered through evolutionary
changes, judicial interpretations, and constitutional amendments; states
are now much more subservient to the central government. But can our
greatly expanded central government act effectively for the public
good? As the country has grown, Congress has become too big to wield
effective power. Therefore, Congress and the nation look to the executive branch for stronger leadership. By doing so, the system of checks
and balances crumbles. More and more, presidents have bypassed Congress and have become popular national leaders-so-called plebiscite
presidents, rallying the people to their programs. Moreover, the permanently preeminent presidency, it seems, is the product of forces that
will continue. Thus, the president will continue to expand his power
with few checks. This expansion will be accomplished, by and large,
with the support of the people and the Congress, who yearn for strong,
decisive leadership. Perhaps it is time to heed the warning Roger Sherman uttered at the Constitutional Convention: "An independence of the

28. J. MADISON, supra note 2, at 194.
29. Id. at 322-23.
30. Id. at 193.
31. Id. at 311-12.
32. Id. at 194.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/5
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Executive on the supreme Legislature, [is] . . . the very essence of tyranny . ...
One question for our generation, then, is how to achieve firm decision making while still preventing the abuse of power in the hands of
one person. Ben Franklin, on the last day of the Constitutional Convention, issued a warning of sorts to future generations which is an appropriate conclusion for us to ponder. He said:
I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are such; because I
think a general Government necessary for us, and there is no form of
Government but what may be a blessing to the people if well administered, and believe farther that this is likely to be well administered for a
course of years, and can only end in Despotism, as other forms have done
before it, when the people shall become so corrupted
as to need despotic
4
Government, being incapable of any other.""

33.

Id. at 48.

at 653.
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